Inaugural Address Prefatory Note Introduction A. Notion of the History of Philosophy 1. Common Ideas regarding the History of Philosophy a. The History of Philosophy as an accumulation of Opinions b. Proof of futility of Philosophical Knowledge obtained through History of Philosophy itself c. Explanatory remarks on the diversity in Philosophies 2. Explanatory remarks on the Definition of the History of Philosophy a. The Notion of Development b. The Notion of the Concrete c. Philosophy as the apprehension of the development of the Concrete 3. Results obtained with respect to the notion of the History of Philosophy a. The development in Time of the various Philosophies b. The application of the foregoing to the treatment of Philosophy c. Further comparison between the History of Philosophy and Philosophy itself B. Relation of Philosophy to other Departments of Knowledge 1. The Historical Side of this Connection a. Outward and historical conditions imposed upon Philosophy b. The commencement in History of an intellectual necessity for Philosophy c. Philosophy as the thought of its time 2. Separation of Philosophy from other allied departments of Knowledge a. Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Knowledge b. Relation of Philosophy to Religion c. Philosophy proper distinguished from Popular Philosophy 3. Commencement of Philosophy and its History a. Freedom of Thought as a first condition b. Separation of the East and its Philosophy c. Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece C. Division, Sources, and Method adopted in treating of the History of Philosophy 1. Division of the History of Philosophy 2. Sources of the History of Philosophy 3. Method of Treatment adopted Oriental Philosophy PART ONE: GREEK PHILOSOPHYPART TWO: PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGESPART THREE: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Introduction Section One: Modern Philosophy in its First Statement THE first two philosophers whom we have to consider are Bacon and Boehme;there is as complete a disparity between these individuals as between their systems of philosophy. None the less both agree that mind operates in the content of its knowledge as in its own domain, and this consequently appears as concrete Being.

This domain in Bacon is the finite, natural world; in Boehme it is the inward, mystical, godly Christian life and existence; for the former starts from experience and induction, the latter from God and the pantheism of the Trinity.

A. Bacon B. Jacob Boehme Section Two: Period of the Thinking Understanding AFTER Neo-Platonisim and all that is associated with it is left behind, it is not until Descartes is arrived at that we really enter upon a philosophy which is, properly speaking, independent, which knows that it comes forth from reason as independent, and that self-consciousness is an essential moment in the truth. Philosophy in its own proper soil separates itself entirely from the philosophizing theology, in accordance with its principle, and places it on quite another side. Here, we may say, we are at home, and like the mariner after a long voyage in a tempestuous sea, we may now hail the sight of land; with Descartes the culture of modern times, the thought of modern Philosophy, really begins to appear, after a long and tedious journey on the way which has led so far. It is specially characteristic of the German that the more servile he on the one hand is, the more uncontrolled is he on the other; restraint and want of restraint - originality, is the angel of darkness that buffets us. In this new period the universal principle by means of which everything in the world is regulated, is the thought that proceeds from itself; it is a certain inwardness, which is above all evidenced in respect to Christianity, and which is the Protestant principle in accordance with which thought has come to the consciousness of the world at large as that to which every man has a claim. Thus because the independently existent thought, this culminating point of inwardness, is now set forth and firmly grasped as such, the dead externality of authority is set aside and regarded as out of place. It is only through my own free thought within that thought can however be recognized and ratified by me. This likewise signifies that such free thought is the universal business of the world and of individuals; it is indeed the duty of every man, since everything is based upon it; thus what claims to rank as established in the world man must scrutinize in his own thoughts. Philosophy is thus become a matter of universal interest, and one respecting which each can judge for himself; for everyone is a thinker from the beginning.

On account of this new beginning to Philosophy we find in the old histories of Philosophy of the seventeenth century - e.g., that of Stanley - the philosophy of the Greeks and Romans only, and Christianity forms the conclusion. The idea was that neither in Christianity nor subsequently any philosophy was to be found, because there was no longer a necessity for it, seeing that the philosophic theology of the Middle Ages had not free, spontaneous thought as its principle (Vol. I. pp. 111, 112). But though it is true that this has now become the philosophic principle, we must not expect that it should be at once methodically developed out of thought. The old assumption is made, that man only attains to the truth through reflection; this plainly is the principle. But the determination and definition of God, the world of the manifold as it appears, is not yet revealed as necessarily proceeding from thought; for we have only reached the thought of a content which is given through ordinary conception, observation, and experience.

On the one hand we see a metaphysic, and, on the other, the particular sciences: on the one hand abstract thought as such, on the other its content taken from experience; these two lines in the abstract stand opposed to one another, and yet they do not separate themselves so sharply. We shall indeed come to an opposition, viz. to that between a priori thought - that the determinations which are to hold good for thought must, be taken from thought itself - and the determination that we must commence, conclude and think from experience. This is the opposition between rationalism and empiricism; but it is really a subordinate one, because even the metaphysical mode in philosophy, which only allows validity to immanent thought, does not take what is methodically developed from the necessity of thought, but in the old way derives its content from inward or outward experience, and through reflection and meditation renders it abstract. The form of philosophy which is first reached through thought is metaphysics, the form of the thinking understanding; this period has, as its outstanding figures, Descartes and Spinoza, likewise Malebranche and Locke, Leibnitz and Wolff. The second form is Scepticism and Criticism with regard to the thinking understanding, to metaphysics as such, and to the universal of empiricism; here we shall go on to speak of representatives of the Scottish, German, and French philosophies; the French materialists again turn back to metaphysics.

Chapter I. - The Metaphysics of the Understanding METAPHYSICS is what reaches after substance, and this implies that one unity, one thought is maintained in opposition to dualism, just as Being was amongst the ancients. In metaphysics itself we have, however, the opposition between substantiality and individuality. What comes first is the spontaneous, but likewise uncritical, metaphysics, and it is represented by Descartes and Spinoza, who assert the unity of Being and thought. The second stage is found in Locke, who treats of the opposition itself inasmuch as he considers the metaphysical Idea of experience, that is the origin of thoughts and their justification, not yet entering on the question of whether they are absolutely true. In the third place we have Leibnitz's monad - the world viewed as a totality.

A. First Division We here encounter the innate ideas of Descartes. The philosophy of Spinoza, in the second place, is related to the philosophy of Descartes as its necessary development only; the method is an important part of it.

A method which stands alongside of Spinozism and which is also a perfected development of Cartesianism, is, in the third place, that by which Malebranche has represented this philosophy.

1. Descartes 2. Spinoza 3. Malebranche B. Second Division It was Locke who became the instrument of setting forth this entire manner of thinking in a systematic way, for he worked out Bacon's position more fully. And if Bacon made sensuous Being to be the truth, Locke demonstrated the universal, Thought, to be present in sensuous Being, or showed that we obtained the universal, the true, from experience. From Locke a wide culture proceeds, influencing English philosophers more especially; the forms adopted by this school were various, but the principle was the same; it became a general method of regarding things in a popular way, and calls itself Philosophy, although the object of Philosophy is not to be met with here.

1. Locke 2. Hugo Grotius 3. Thomas Hobbes 4. Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston 5. Puffendorf 6. Newton C. Third Division The third development of the philosophy of the understanding is that represented by Leibnitz and Wolff. If Wolff's metaphysics is divested of its rigid form, we have as a result the later popular philosophy.

1. Leibnitz 2. Wolff 3. German Popular Philosophy Chapter II. - Transition Period THE decadence which we find in thought until the philosophy of Kant is reached, is manifested in what was at this time advocated in opposition to the metaphysic of the understanding, and which may be called a general popular philosophy, a reflecting empiricism, which to a greater or less extent becomes itself a metaphysic; just as, on the other hand, that metaphysic, in as far as it extended to particular sciences, becomes empiricism. As against these metaphysical contradictions, as against the artificialities of the metaphysical synthesis, as against the assistance of God, the preestablished harmony, the best possible world, &c., as against this merely artificial understanding, we now find that fixed principles, immanent in mind, have been asserted or maintained respecting what is felt, intuitively perceived and honoured in the cultured human breast. And in distinction to the assertion that we only find the solution in the principles of a fixed and permanent content form a reconciliation here and now, they adopt a position of independence, and assume an intellectual standing-ground which they find in what has generally been termed the healthy human understanding. Such determinations may indeed be found to be perfectly good and valid if the feelings, intuitions, heart and understanding of man be morally and intellectually fashioned; for in that case better and more noble feelings and desires may rule in men and a more universal content, may be expressed in these principles. But when men make what we call sound reason - that which is by nature implanted in man's breast - into the content and the principle, the healthy human understanding discovers itself to be identical with a feeling and knowledge belonging to nature. The Indians who worship a cow, and who expose or slay newborn children, and commit all sorts of barbarous deeds, the Egyptians who pray to a bird, the apis, &c., and the Turks as well, all possess a healthy human understanding similar in nature.

But the healthy human understanding and the natural feeling of rude and barbarous Turks， when taken as a standard， result in shocking principles.

When we speak of healthy human understanding， however， of natural feelings， we always have before our eyes a cultured mind； and those who make the healthy human reason， the natural knowledge， the immediate feelings and inspirations found in themselves， into a rule and standard， do not know that when religion， morality， and rectitude are discovered to be present in the human breast， this is due to culture and education， which are the first to make such principles into natural feelings. Here natural feelings and the healthy human understanding are thus made the principle； and much may be recognized as coming under these heads. This then is the form taken by Philosophy in the eighteenth century. Taken as a whole， three points of view have to be considered； in the first place， Hume must be regarded on his own account， then the Scottish， and， thirdly， the French philosophy. Hume is a sceptic； the Scottish philosophy opposes the scepticism of Hume， the French philosophy has in the "enlightenment" of Germany (by which expression is indicated that form of German philosophy which is not Wolffian metaphysics)an appendage of a feebler form. Since from the metaphysical God we can make no further progress in the concrete， Locke grounds his content on experience. But that empiricism leads thought to no fixed standpoint， Hume demonstrates by denying every universal； the Scottish philosophers， on the contrary， undoubtedly maintain universal propositions and truths， but not through thought. Hence in empiricism itself the fixed standpoint has now to be adopted； thus the French find the universal in the actuality which they call réalité. They do not， however， find its content in and from thought， but as living substance， as nature and matter. All this is a further working out of reflecting empiricism， and some more details respecting it must still be given.

A. Idealism and Scepticism Thought generally is simple， universal self-identity， but in the form of negative movement， whereby the determinate abrogates itself. This movement of Being-for-self is now an essential moment of thought， while hitherto it was outside it； and thus grasping itself as movement in itself， thought is self-consciousness - at first indeed formal， as individual self-consciousness. Such a form it has in scepticism， but this distinction marks it off from the older scepticism， that now the certainty of reality is made the starting point. With the ancients， on the contrary， scepticism is the return into individual consciousness in such a way that to it this consciousness is not the truth， in other words that scepticism does not give expression to the results arrived at， and attains no positive significance. But since in the modern world this absolute substantiality， this unity of implicitude and self-consciousness is fundamental - that is， this faith in reality generally - scepticism has here the form of idealism， i.e.， of expressing self-consciousness or certainty of self as all reality and truth. The crudest form of this idealism is when self-consciousness， as individual or formal， does not proceed further than to say： All objects are our conceptions. We find this subjective idealism in Berkeley， (1)and another form of the same in Hume.

1. Berkeley 2. Hume B. Scottish Philosophy In Scotland quite another school of thought developed， and the Scotch are the foremost of Hume's opponents； in German philosophy， on the other hand， we have to recognize in Kant another opposing force to that of Hume. To the Scottish school many philosophers belong； English philosophy is now restricted to Edinburgh and Glasgow， in which places a number of professors belonging to this school succeeded one another. To the scepticism of Hume they oppose an inward independent source of truth for all that pertains to religion and morality.

This coincides with Kant， who also maintains an inward source or spring as against external perception； but in the case of Kant this has quite another form than that which it possesses with the Scottish philosophers. To them this inward independent source is not thought or reason as such， for the content which comes to pass from this inwardness is concrete in its nature， and likewise demands for itself the external matter of experience. It consists of popular principles， which on the one hand are opposed to the externality of the sources of knowledge， and， on the other， to metaphysics as such， to abstract thought or reasoning on its own account. This sort of reasoning understanding applied itself to ethics and to politics - sciences which have been much developed by German， French， and above all by Scottish philosophers (supra， p. 320)； they regarded morality as cultured men would， and sought to bring moral duties under a principle.